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Does PIN affect equity prices around the world?
Abstract
This study examines the empirical controversy over the pricing effect of Easley, Hvidkjaer, and
O’Hara’s (2002) probability of information-based trading, PIN , on a sample of 30,095 firms from
47 countries worldwide. Contrary to the empirical evidence of Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara,
but consistent with that of Duarte and Young (2009), we find no evidence that PIN exhibits a
positive effect on a cross-section of expected stock returns in international markets. Alternative
information-based trading measures also display no effect on expected stock returns, corroborating
our finding that information risk proxied by PIN , in general, has no pricing effect in world markets.
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1. Introduction
Easley and O’Hara (2004) suggest that information risk arising from information asymmetry
between informed and uninformed investors is systematic and non-diversifiable. Using a rational
expectations asset pricing model, they show that more information asymmetry increases the risk
faced by uninformed investors since informed investors can shift their portfolio weights to adjust
for new information. All else equal, uninformed investors demand a premium to hold shares in
firms with higher information asymmetry, since the uninformed expect to lose to the informed and
therefore demand to be compensated for this expected loss. Based on a structural microstructure
model, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) derive a measure of private information-based trading,
the PIN measure, and find a strong positive cross-sectional relationship between expected stock
returns and PIN , suggesting that information asymmetry, as measured by PIN , is priced.
Recent theoretical and empirical studies, however, provide results that challenge the evidence
that asymmetric information risk embodied in PIN has a pricing effect. Theoretically, Hughes, Liu,
and Liu (2007) and Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) yield empirical implications that are at
variance with those in Easley and O’Hara (2004). Specifically, their models imply that information
risk is potentially idiosyncratic in nature and hence, fully diversifiable. Empirically, Duarte and
Young (2009) find no evidence that supports Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara’s (2002) finding that
PIN is associated with priced information risk.1 They decompose PIN into two components,
one related to asymmetric information and one related to illiquidity, and find that only the PIN
component related to illiquidity is priced. They therefore argue that liquidity effects unrelated to
information asymmetry explain the cross-sectional relation between PIN and expected returns.
Given the extensive applications of PIN , implicitly and explicitly, as a proxy for priced infor-
mation risk in both finance and accounting literatures,2 it is imperative that we investigate this
contentious issue by subjecting PIN to robust out-of-sample analyses. Thus far, existing empiri-
cal studies focus only on the US market, and it is therefore important that we examine the asset
1Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) replicate Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara’s study and report that the evidence in
the latter is not robust to alternative specifications and time periods. The effect of PIN on expected returns becomes
negative and insignificant in an extended period from 1999 to 2002.
2See Appendix A of Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) for a detailed list of references.
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pricing implications of PIN in non-US markets. Specifically, to resolve the debatable issue of
whether information risk measured by PIN is priced, we need to test whether the Easley, Hvid-
kjaer, and O’Hara (2002) PIN (hereafter PINEHO), the asymmetric information component of
PIN (hereafter PINDY ), as derived by Duarte and Young (2009), or both systematically explain
cross-sectional variation in expected stock returns across international markets.
Our study begins by estimating PINEHO and PINDY using the methodologies developed by
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) and Duarte and Young (2009) on a sample of 30,095 interna-
tional stocks across 47 countries worldwide. Our estimates of the probability of informed trading for
each stock are based on the information in the newly available global intradaily stock transactions
data provided by Thomson Reuters Tick History database (TRTH) for the period from 1996 to
2010. While our study represents the first to estimate PINs for this large cross-section of interna-
tional firms, one concern is that stocks of these firms are mostly traded on electronic order-driven
markets, which might be inconsistent with the market microstructure model of market making in
which PIN is derived. As a result, it is possible that our PIN estimates may not actually capture
the probability of informed trading for our sample of stocks that we have expected. To address this
issue, we conduct two different tests to assess the quality of our PIN estimates.3
First, following Easley et al. (1996), we show how well our PIN estimates predict different
measures of spreads. Theoretical studies have shown that spreads widen as adverse selection costs
caused by informed trading become larger. Thus, we use spreads as a means to verify the quality of
our PIN estimates, while controlling for trading volume. Next, we examine the association between
PIN estimates and several other proxies of information asymmetry at firm and country levels. If
the PIN estimates capture the level of private information, then they should be strongly correlated
with other proxies of information asymmetry commonly adopted in the existing literature. Our
firm-level proxies for information asymmetry include analysts following, analyst forecast dispersion,
press coverage, firm age, index membership, and closely-held ownership, while country-level proxies
are a country’s accounting standard index, disclosure requirement index, newspapers circulation,
capital market governance, and financial transparency factor. We find that our PIN estimates are
3We thank the referee for this excellent suggestion.
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strongly correlated with spreads and with firm- and country-level asymmetric-information proxies
in predictable ways, indicating the reasonableness of our estimates of the probability of informed
trading using order flows from automated trading systems. Even though these analyses suggest that
our findings are quite robust, some concerns about the adequacy of PIN estimates still remain.
Our evidence should therefore be interpreted cautiously, keeping these concerns in mind.
We next turn to examining whether the information risk captured by PIN can systematically
explain cross-sectional variation in expected stock returns. We conduct two different asset pricing
tests. First, we form portfolios of stocks single-sorted on PIN and also double-sorted on a firm’s
market capitalization and PIN and then compute excess returns and risk-adjusted returns on each
of these portfolios. Results indicate no significant differences in excess returns or in risk-adjusted
returns between high and low PIN -formed portfolios, even after controlling for the market capital-
ization of the portfolios. Second, using Fama-MacBeth’s (1973) approach, we find that PINEHO
exhibits no significant positive relationship with future realized stock returns. These results are
robust to orders submitted by algorithm trading implemented in a multiplicity of markets. Fur-
thermore, consistent with Duarte and Young (2009), we also find that the asymmetric information
component of PINDY exhibits no significant impact on the cross-section of expected stock returns.
All this evidence therefore provides no support that PIN reflects information risk systematically
priced by investors.
Finally, if information risk related to PIN is diversifiable, it is possible that we can find similar
evidence when we use alternative information-based trading measures in place of PIN in our asset
pricing tests. We exploit the richness of our database to estimate four alternative information-based
trading measures drawn from the existing literature, namely Hasbrouck’s (1991) measure of relative
trade informativeness, Huang and Stoll’s (1996, 1997) percentage price impact measure and adverse
selection component, and Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans’s (1997) asymmetric information
parameter. We repeat our asset pricing tests using these four measures, separately, as well as using
the first principal components extracted from these four measures with different combinations of
PINEHO and PINDY . Our evidence remains robust that information risk proxied by trading-based
measures has no effect on the cross-section of expected stock returns in international markets.
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Our research contributes to several strands of finance and accounting literatures. First, our
study represents the first to examine the pricing of PIN in an international setting, and such an
analysis should provide sufficiently robust evidence to help resolve the debate on whether PIN is a
priced information risk. We show that the pricing effect of PIN in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara
(2002) is neither robust to the time period of our study, nor is it robust across our sample of equity
markets. Our results further corroborate the findings of Duarte and Young (2009) who focus on
US equity markets and also provide no evidence that PIN reflects information risk priced by
investors. In addition, our exploratory analysis using four other popular measures of information-
based trading reinforces our overall evidence that information risk proxied by PIN , in general, has
no pricing effect in international equity markets.
Second, our work adds to a growing empirical literature that successfully applies PIN to ex-
plaining various information-based regularities. This measure is used to study informed trading
across different markets (Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas, 1998) and types of securities (Easley et
al., 1996), stock price reactions to public and private news surprises (Vega, 2006), the information
effect of IPO underpricing (Ellul and Pagano, 2006), the corporate investment sensitivity to stock
prices (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007), the impact of Regulation FD on information asymmetry
(Duarte et al., 2008), among others. Our study contributes to this literature by showing that PIN ,
while not priced, is strongly associated with various proxies of information asymmetry at both firm
and country levels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the methodologies
and estimation of PINEHO and PINDY for our sample of 30,095 firms from 47 countries worldwide
and then assesses the quality of the two PIN estimates. Section 3 investigates the asset pricing
implications of PIN , and Section 4 examines the relation between other trading-based information
asymmetry measures and equity prices. The final section summarizes the paper.
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2. The Estimation of PINEHO and PINDY Models
This section first describes PIN , which is derived from the market microstructure model of
Easley et al. (1996) and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), and its extension by Duarte
and Young (2009). It then discusses the methodologies and global intradaily transactions data
employed in estimating the two measures of PIN , followed by cross-country summary statistics of
their estimates. In this section, we also perform several tests to assess the quality of these estimates.
2.1. The PIN Model and its Extension
PIN is derived from the structural microstructure model of Easley et al. (1996) and Easley,
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) and is based on the imbalance between buy and sell orders among
investors.4 The premise of their model is that order imbalances reflect active trading of informed
investors, resulting from the arrival of private information. Otherwise, a more stable and balanced
order flow is observed if trading is not driven by private information. Therefore, PIN is a firm-level
estimate of the probability that an observed trade originates from a privately informed investor,
who may have advance knowledge of analysts’ reports, proprietary industry or macro forecasts,
insider information, superior ability to process public information, among others.
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) compute PINEHO as a fraction of orders that arises from
informed investors relative to the overall order flow,5 as follows.
PINEHO =
α · µ
α · µ+ εS + εB , (1)
where α is the probability that a private information event occurs at the beginning of the trading
day, µ is the daily arrival rate of orders from informed investors, and εB and εS are the daily arrival
rates of buy and sell orders from uninformed investors.
Duarte and Young (2009), however, show that the PINEHO model does not capture the preva-
lent positive correlation between buyer- and seller-initiated order flows or the large variances of these
4PIN takes into account patterns in the number of trades, but not trade size. Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara
(2002) show that trade volume reveals little information beyond the number of trades, suggesting that PIN is an
adequate proxy for the degree of informed trading.
5A more detailed discussion of PIN is contained in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002).
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order flows. The two authors extend the PINEHO model to account for the observed volatility and
positive correlation between buyer- and seller-initiated order flows by allowing for simultaneous
positive shocks to both order flows. This extended model allows them to compute an adjusted
measure of asymmetric information (hereafter PINDY ),
PINDY =
α · (d · µB + (1− d) · µS)
α · (d · µB + (1− d) · µS) + (∆B + ∆S) · (α · θ′ + (1− α) · θ) + εS + εB , (2)
where d is the probability that informed traders receive a positive signal if a private information
event occurs on a specific day, µB is the arrival rate of informed buyers, µS is the arrival rate of
informed sellers, and θ is the probability that a symmetric order shock occurs in the absence of
private information, whereas θ′ is the probability that a symmetric order shock occurs when private
information arrives. In the event of symmetric order flow shocks, the additional arrival rate of buys
is ∆B and of sells is ∆S .
Duarte and Young’s (2009) extended model also gives rise to an associated probability, PSOS,
the unconditional probability that a given trade will come from a shock to both buy and sell order
flows,
PSOS =
(∆B + ∆S) · (α · θ′ + (1− α) · θ)
α · (d · µb + (1− d) · µs) + (∆B + ∆S) · (α · θ′ + (1− α) · θ) + εS + εB . (3)
They find that firms with high PSOS tend to have high Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures on
most days, but experience large increases in both buy and sell orders on days with the release of
public information. Shocks to both buy and sell orders may occur when traders disagree about the
interpretation of a public news event, or when traders coordinate their trades on certain days to
reduce transaction costs. Duarte and Young therefore argue that PSOS is effectively a proxy for
illiquidity unrelated to asymmetric information.
As the PINDY model contains twice as many parameters as the PINEHO model, we follow
Duarte and Young (2009) by estimating a parsimonious specification of PINDY with θ equals θ
′.
Throughout this study, our analysis employs this model specification as it facilitates the estimation
of PINDY in that its maximum likelihood estimation tends to converge more easily.
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2.2. PIN Methodology and Global Intraday Data
Based on the maximum likelihood estimation procedure, we estimate both PINEHO and PINDY
for every available stock using global intradaily stock transactions data from 47 countries worldwide
over a 15-year period from January 2, 1996 to December 31, 2010. For a majority of the countries,
the global transactions data are available from 1996 onwards. Appendix A lists the starting date
of the data for each country.
The global intradaily transactions data are from TRTH,6 managed by the Securities Industry
Research Center of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). TRTH provides millisecond-time-stamped tick data of
over 5 million equity and equity derivatives instruments worldwide since January 2, 1996, and such
data are sourced from the Reuters Integrated Data Network, which obtains feeds directly from the
exchanges. TRTH has an equity coverage of 250 regular stock exchanges in more than 100 countries.
As constrained by the availability of price data from Datastream and financial information from the
Worldscope, our study only focuses on all securities listed in the main exchanges of 47 countries,
and these stock exchanges are listed in Appendix A. For China, Japan, and the United States, we
include stocks listed in their two main exchanges given their equal importance in the countries.It
is necessary to emphasize that while the NASDAQ market is the second largest in the United
States in terms of market capitalization, our sample excludes stocks traded in this market for two
reasons. One, it allows us to compare our results with those of existing US studies that focus on
only NYSE and AMEX stocks. Two, the NASDAQ market is a multiple-dealer market and its
multiple trades based on the same order might affect the recorded number of buys and sells and
hence, PIN estimates.
The initial sample covers 57,892 securities. We merge these securities with the Datastream
database to obtain their basic firm-level information by using codes provided by Thomson Reuters
terminals. For those securities that cannot be matched by Thomson Reuters codes, we manually
match them by firm names. In total, we are able to match 44,760 securities. Next, we apply filters
provided by Datastream to eliminate American Depositary Receipts, Global Depositary Receipts,
6The database was formerly known as the global TaqTic.
7
warrants, trusts, funds, and non-equity securities from our sample. After filtering, our sample is
reduced to 30,095 domestic stocks that belong to their respective major share class of firms and
whose primary listings are in the main stock exchange(s) of the country.
When estimating PIN , we require trades and quotes submitted during the regular trading hours
of each stock exchange. TRTH provides information on trade qualifiers. Thus, trades identified as
irregular trades or with negative trading prices are excluded. For quotes, we eliminate those with
bid-ask spreads that are greater than half their mid-point quote prices. We employ the Lee and
Ready (1991) algorithm to identify buyer- or seller-initiated trades. If quotes are missing during a
trading day, we use tick tests to classify trades and then estimate the yearly PIN parameters using
the maximum likelihood approach. It is noted that consistent with Duarte and Young (2009), our
untabulated results also show that buyer- and seller-initiated orders are positively and significantly
correlated, with mean (median) correlation coefficients of 0.543 (0.581) for stocks from developed
markets, 0.645 (0.692) for those from emerging markets, and 0.597 (0.640) for the full sample. The
magnitude of the correlation coefficients is comparable with the 0.50 median correlation coefficient
reported in Table 1 of Duarte and Young (p. 121) for their US sample. The observed correlation
coefficients in our sample of buyer- and seller-initiated orders suggest that our international analysis
ought to employ Duarte and Young’s approach to estimating PIN .
To avoid corner and local optimal solutions in our maximum likelihood estimations, we try
a set of 7,776 (i.e., 6 different initial values for each of the 5 parameters) initial values for each
maximization algorithm of PINEHO and a set of 19,683 (i.e., 3 different initial values for each of the
9 parameters) initial values for each maximization algorithm of PINDY and pick the parameters
associated with the largest maximum likelihood value. Finally, we exclude observations with PIN
estimates of zero or one, and these observations constitute on average about 5.2% of our total
sample size for PINEHO estimates and 6.7% for PINDY estimates. As a result, our final sample
covers 30,095 firms across 47 countries.
It is important to stress that we have made several checks on the accuracy of the newly, untested
TRTH. First, we compare the trades from TRTH and TAQ databases for NYSE stocks reported
in our sample period. After screening out duplicate trades reported in TAQ data, the trades from
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these two databases are identical. Note that Thomson Reuters has already filtered their data
in TRTH by eliminating duplicate trades from the raw exchange data before making their data
available to SIRCA. Second, we also compare trades and quotes information between TRTH and
other transactions data collected from local stock exchanges that are available to us, namely the
Australian stock exchange and Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. We find the information
from TRTH and the two exchanges to be substantially the same. Third, we also cross-check our
mean and median PIN estimates with those reported in existing studies. For example, the mean
and median PINEHO estimates for NYSE stocks for the period of 1983-1998 are 0.191 and 0.185
in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), NYSE and AMEX stocks for the period of 1983-1999 are
0.211 and 0.191 in Aslan et al. (2011), and our sample of NYSE and AMEX stocks for the period of
1996-2010 are 0.190 (mean) and 0.161 (median). Similarly, the median PINDY estimate for NYSE
and AMEX stocks is 0.17 in Duarte and Young (2009), and the mean (median) PINDY estimate
in our sample is 0.170 (0.151). While the PIN estimates are in the same order of magnitude, the
decreasing trend in the PIN estimate probably reflects the increasing financial transparency of US
markets and the implementation of an automated trading system in 2000. All these various checks
reinforce our level of confidence in the accuracy of SIRCA’s TRTH.
Table 1 presents the distributions of PINEHO and PINDY estimates, together with the number
of sample firms, by country. Specifically, it reports their respective mean, standard deviation,
quartiles 1 and 3, and median value. We estimate the two PINs for each firm-year across a sample
of 16,840 firms from 22 developed countries and 13,255 firms from 25 emerging countries. The
number of firms from each country is generally proportional to the size of its economy. Among the
developed markets, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom have the largest number
of firms, with each having at least 2,000 firms included in our sample, whereas Luxembourg has
the smallest with only 10 firms. With the exception of India with 2,739 firms in our sample, the
largest number of sample firms from emerging economies such as China, Taiwan and Malaysia is
fewer than 2,000.
The table shows striking contrasts between the two PINs and across developed and emerging
markets. Overall, the mean, median, and both quartiles of PINEHO are consistently larger than
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their PINDY counterparts. Consistent with Duarte and Young’s (2009) expectation, the larger
PINEHO estimate reflects not only the probability of informed trading, but also illiquidity effects
unrelated to information asymmetry. For the full sample of countries, average differences between
PINEHO and PINDY estimates are 0.054 (0.061) for the mean (median). Despite the difference in
their sizes, PINEHO and PINDY estimates are highly correlated. The untabulated cross-country
correlation coefficient of the mean (median) estimate between PINEHO and PINDY is 79.2%
(80.3%).
The means of PINEHO and PINDY , with few exceptions of the latter, are at least twice the
size of their respective standard deviations. The statistics indicate that emerging markets have a
larger PIN than do developed markets. Based on the mean and median values, PINEHO is about
13.4%-14.6% larger in emerging than in developed markets, and PINDY is about 12.3%-13.5%
larger. Unreported p−values from the t−test for the mean differentials in PINEHO and PINDY
are 0.019 and 0.029, respectively, and from the Kruskal-Wallis test for their median differentials
are 0.008 and 0.012, indicating that stocks from developed and emerging markets have statistically
different PINs. Among the developed markets, the United States has the smallest PIN estimates
of 0.190 for PINEHO and 0.170 for PINDY , while among the emerging markets, China has the
smallest PINs of 0.175 for PINEHO and 0.146 for PINDY . Unlike US equity markets, Chinese
equity markets are mainly dominated by individual investors, who make up of 99.5% of the total
number of investor accounts in the markets (Ng and Wu, 2006). It is plausible that the low PIN
estimates for China predominantly arise from individual investor trading.
2.3. The Quality of PIN as a Measure of Information Asymmetry
In our study, a majority of stock exchanges have implemented automated electronic trading
systems during our sample period from January 1996 to December 2010. Only the stock exchanges
of Egypt, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the U.K., and the United States (i.e., NYSE)
started automated trading after 1996. Many of these electronic markets are organized as electronic
limit order books. This form of market structure typically has no designated liquidity provider such
as a specialist or a dealer. We recognize that such electronic order-driven markets are inconsistent
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with the market structure type assumed in a PIN model with a central market maker.7
In this subsection, we examine whether PIN estimated using order flows from electronic limit
order books actually perform as a measure of information asymmetry. We perform two different
sets of tests to evaluate the quality of PIN estimates. One test follows Easley et al. (1996) by
investigating whether PIN estimates have predictive power for spreads, and the other test examines
whether PIN estimates are associated with other measures of information asymmetry at the firm
and country levels.
2.3.1. PIN and Spreads
Easley et al. (1996) contend that if the quality of PIN estimates is adequate, then PIN should
have a positive effect on bid-ask spreads. They investigate this issue by regressing spreads on PIN .
If their model accurately estimates the probability of informed trading, they would expect the
coefficient on PIN to be positive, implying that the larger the probability of informed trading, the
wider are spreads. In addition, their regression analysis also includes trading volume to account
for any inventory effect on spreads, and if such effects matter, then trading volume would have a
negative impact on spreads.
Following Easley et al. (1996), we conduct pooled cross-country regressions of spreads, Spread,
on both PIN and stock turnover, Turnover, as follows.
Spread = δ0 + δ1PIN + δ2Turnover + Controls+ . (4)
We compute two different measures of spreads, the effective spread (ESpread) and quoted spread
(QSpread), and for each measure, we calculate an equal-weighted and a volume-weighted average
of daily percentage spreads. We also compute the correlations between these spreads and PIN .
Untabulated results indicate that the average correlations between PINEHO and ESpread are
31.7% (full sample), 25.2% (developed markets), and 41.1% (emerging markets), and those between
PINDY and ESpread are 19.1%, 15.8%, and 24.1%. Correspondingly, the average correlations
between PINEHO and QSpread are 31.7% (full sample), 24.4% (developed markets), and 44.3%
7While there is no market making in electronic automated trading systems, the experimental study of Bloomfield,
O’Hara, and Saar (2005) shows that a market-making role still arises endogenously in the electronic markets.
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(emerging markets), and those between PINDY and QSpread are 19.8%, 15.6%, and 26.9%. All
these statistics suggest that both PIN measures are positively and strongly correlated with spreads,
consistent with those of Easley et al. (1996). Results in Table 2 further reinforce these findings,
thereby validating the quality of PIN estimates. Both PINEHO and PINDY have strong positive
effects on the two different measures of spreads, while Turnover displays a strong negative effect.
2.3.2. PIN and Proxies for Information Asymmetry at Firm and Country Levels
We now turn to testing the quality of PIN by verifying whether PIN is strongly associated
with other measures of information asymmetry that are extensively employed in extant empirical
studies. If PIN actually provides an estimate of the probability of information-based trading for
each stock, then it should be highly correlated with other measures of information asymmetry. To
address this issue, we regress PIN on several firm- and country-level information proxies, separately,
while controlling for variables that can potentially affect the relationship between PIN and the
information proxy in question.
Drawn from the existing literature, the firm-level measures of information asymmetry are the
number of analysts following a firm (Analysts), analyst forecast dispersion (FDisp), press cover-
age of the firm (Press), firm age (Age), MSCI membership (MSCI), and closely-held ownership
(CHeld), with control variables including log of total assets (TAssets), log of book-to-market
(BM), leverage (Leverage), return on total assets (ROA), American Depositary Receipts (ADR),
research and development scaled by total assets (R&D), and stock return volatility (σRet). The
country-level proxies for information asymmetry are a country’s accounting standard index (AcStd),
disclosure requirement index (DReq), newspapers circulation (Newspapers), capital market gov-
ernance (CMG), and financial transparency factor (FTran), as well as control variables, namely
GDP per capita (GDPC), stock market capitalization deflated by GDP (MCap), ratio of private
credit to GDP (Credit), annual GDP growth (GDPg), standard deviation of GDP over the past
five years (σGDP ), market segmentation measure (SEG), and law and order index (Law & Order).
All these variables are defined in Appendix B. Panel A of Table 3 shows pooled cross-country re-
gressions of firm-level PIN on each information proxy as well as control variables at the firm level,
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whereas Panel B reports regression results of the country-median PIN against each country-level
information proxy while controlling for country characteristics and year fixed effects.8
Several notable observations emerge from Table 3. Panel A shows that PIN is strongly asso-
ciated with the level of a firm’s information asymmetry measured using the extent of its analyst
coverage and the earnings forecasts dispersion (Analysts and FDisp). The estimated coefficients
on analyst coverage and forecast dispersion are all statistically significant at conventional levels.
Similarly, firms with wide press coverage, older firms, firms with MSCI membership, and those
that are less closely held ought to be associated with a low level of information asymmetry and
hence, have low PINs. For instance, the coefficient estimates of Press, Age, MSCI, and CHeld in
M3-M6, where PINEHO is the dependent variable, are −0.008 (t = −18.02), −0.000 (t = −8.29),
−0.028 (t = −33.65), and 0.020 (t = 15.94), respectively. Similar qualitative results are obtained
in M9-M12, where PINDY is the dependent variable. These findings suggest that more serious ad-
verse selection problems are evident in firms with low quality of analyst coverage or press coverage,
small firms, firms whose stocks are not index members, and concentrated ownership firms. More
importantly, our estimates of PINEHO and PINDY are able to reflect these adverse information
costs, indicating that the quality of both PIN estimates is reasonable.
Country-level results presented in Panel B further reinforce our earlier findings about the quality
of PIN estimates. The panel shows that PIN is strongly and negatively associated with all the
different information proxies at the country level, indicating that PIN decreases as the country’s
level of information asymmetry falls. All the coefficients of these information variables, except for
FTran in M10, are statistically significant at the 5% level.
The overall results suggest that the two different PIN measures provide adequate estimates
of the probability of information-based trading in stocks from markets with electronic limit order
books. Even though these findings are robust, we acknowledge that some concerns about measure-
ment error of PIN still remain. Hence, our evidence should be interpreted with caution.
8The results remain qualitatively the same if we use value-weighted PIN as the dependent variable.
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3. PIN and Equity Prices Around the World
In this section, we employ two different approaches to testing the pricing of PIN in an inter-
national framework: (i) We first look at the distribution of stock returns across portfolios of stocks
single-sorted on PIN and double-sorted on Size and then PIN ; (ii) We test whether PIN affects
cross-sectional expected stock returns using Fama and French’s (1992) asset pricing framework.
3.1. Excess Returns and Risk-Adjusted Returns of Portfolios formed on PIN and on Size
and PIN
In Table 4, we examine the time-series association between PIN and portfolio excess returns
for the period from 1997 to 2011. We compute time-series average monthly excess returns and
risk-adjusted returns, Alphas, of global portfolios of stocks single-sorted on PIN and of stocks
double-sorted on Size and then PIN .
We form single-sorted PIN quintile portfolios as follows. For each year and for each country,
we first rank stocks based on their prior-year PIN estimates from the lowest to the highest and
then group these stocks into quintiles based on their ranked PINs. We then combine stocks of the
same PIN quintile-ranking across all countries into a global PIN -ranked quintile. For example,
the Low PIN portfolio consists of stocks in the lowest PIN quintile portfolio from their respective
countries, and the High PIN portfolio contains those from the highest PIN quintile portfolio.
We repeat this procedure annually. For double-sorted portfolios, we do the same, except that we
first form three groups of stocks from each country based on their prior-year market capitalization
(Size), and within each Size portfolio, we form five groups of stocks based on their prior-year
PIN estimates. Similar to single-sorted portfolios, we aggregate all stocks of the same Size-PIN
rankings across countries into global Size-PIN portfolios. For each global portfolio of stocks, we
compute its time-series value-weighted average of raw returns in excess of a 30-day US Treasury
bill rate.
To obtain the Alpha of a portfolio, we regress each monthly global portfolio excess returns
against Fama-French global factors for the global market portfolio (MKTG), market capitalization
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(SMBG), and book-to-market (HMLG),
rGp,t = Alpha+ βMKT
G
t + hHML
G
t + sSMB
G
t + εt, (5)
where rGp,t is the monthly global portfolio return in excess of a 30-day US Treasury bill rate, the
intercept Alpha is the risk-adjusted return, and MKTG is the global market index excess return.
SMBG and HMLG are constructed as follows. For each country and each year, country-level
SMBC and HMLC factors for July of year t to June of year t+ 1 are constructed using six value-
weighted portfolios formed at June-end of year t on the intersection of two Size portfolios and
three BM portfolios. The size breakpoint is determined by the median market capitalization of
the country at June-end of year t, with firms below the median classified as small firms and those
above as big firms. The BM breakpoints are 30th and 70th percentiles of firm BMs of the country
at the fiscal year ending t− 1, with the top 30% of firms grouped as the value portfolio, the middle
40% as the middle portfolio, and the bottom 30% as the growth portfolio. The SMBC factor is
the difference in the monthly average return between the three small portfolios and the three big
portfolios, and the HMLC factor is the difference in the monthly average return between the two
value portfolios and two growth portfolios. We group country-level HMLC factors together to form
the global HMLG factor and country-level SMBC factors together to construct the global SMBG
factor.
Panel A of Table 4 provides average excess returns and Alphas for PIN -sorted global portfolios
of stocks, while Panel B presents those of Size-PIN sorted global portfolios. Results of Panel A
show no systematic pattern of a positive relationship between PIN and portfolio excess returns.
Instead, we find that the average excess returns and Alphas tend to be larger for Low than for
High PIN portfolios, and that this pattern persists across portfolios formed on either PINEHO
or PINDY . Differential excess returns and Alphas are smaller for High−Low PINDY portfolios,
compared with those for High−Low PINEHO portfolios.9 But none of these differential excess
returns and Alphas are statistically different from zero, consistent with Duarte and Young’s (2009)
findings that PINDY has no effect on expected stock returns.
9The differential results are not surprising, because PINEHO contains both asymmetric information and liquidity
components, whereas PINDY is only associated with the asymmetric information component.
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Similar to Panel A, Panel B depicts larger excess returns and Alphas mostly in Low than in
High PIN portfolios, holding size constant, but again, the differences are statistically insignificant
at conventional levels. Our overall findings suggest no apparent evidence of any correlation between
excess returns or Alphas and PIN . While our results differ from those of Easley, Hvidkjaer, and
O’Hara (2002), they are consistent with the findings reported in Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009).
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara show that PIN is positively associated with excess returns for the
sample period between 1983 and 1998 and that the difference between high and low PIN excess
returns is smaller in small than in large stocks. They argue that private information tends to have
a greater impact on price for small stocks than for large stocks. On the other hand, Mohanram and
Rajgopal employ a longer sample period of 1984-2002, but find that the spread in returns between
the highest and lowest PIN deciles is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels.
Overall, the time-series regression results provide no evidence that asymmetric information
proxied by PIN has any effect on equity prices. In subsequent subsections, we provide further
analyses to examine whether PIN is priced in a cross-sectional asset pricing framework.
3.2. PIN and the Cross-Section of Expected Equity Returns
In this subsection, we conduct asset pricing tests similar to those employed by Easley, Hvidkjaer,
and O’Hara (2002) and Duarte and Young (2009) to examine whether the asymmetric information
or illiquidity component of PIN is priced in an international setting. Table 5 reports time-series
averages of the estimated coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of excess stock returns against
PIN and with combinations of PSOS and Illiquidity, while controlling for previously found return
predictors, namely the log of book-to-market equity ratio (BM), log of market capitalization (Size),
country market beta (βC), and global market beta (βG). The definitions of all the variables together
with their data sources are contained in Appendix B. The table also shows time-series averages of
the regression slope coefficients, together with their robust t−statistics in parentheses, for the full
sample of firms from 47 countries and sub-samples of firms from developed and emerging markets.
The table reveals several distinctive results. First, our findings show a negative and mainly
statistically insignificant PINEHO coefficient. The negative PINEHO coefficient, however, seems
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counter-intuitive, because it suggests that the expected return is decreasing in information risk.
Although this finding contradicts Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara’s (2002) result that PIN reflects
information risk systematically priced by investors, it is consistent with the US evidence documented
in Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009). The latter employ the implied cost of capital as a proxy for
the expected return and show the PINEHO coefficient to be negative and not robustly significant
at conventional levels. They therefore argue that the pricing of PINEHO is sensitive to alternative
specifications and time periods. Our findings further reinforce their results by also showing that
the effect of PINEHO on the cross-section of expected returns is not robust across international
markets.
Second, the results based on PINDY are broadly consistent with Duarte and Young’s (2009)
findings that PINDY exhibits no effect on expected returns, suggesting that asymmetric information
associated with PINEHO is not priced. Illiquidity continues to maintain its level of significance
in all model specifications. The role of illiquidity in asset prices is not only shown in Duarte and
Young’s study of US equity markets, but also consistent with the recent evidence documented in
Lee (2011) that liquidity risk is priced in international financial markets. We also show that only
the book-to-market effect is strongly significant and positive, and that other conventional proxies
for firm risk, such as country and global market betas as well as Size, are insignificantly related to
the cross-section of expected stock returns. These findings are also reported in both Duarte and
Young and Lee.
Third, when PSOS and PINEHO are estimated jointly in model M3, the coefficient of the
illiquidity component PSOS, not associated with information asymmetry, is statistically significant
and negative. A similar result is obtained when PINDY is used in place of PINEHO in model M11.
These results seem to contradict Duarte and Young’s (2009) finding of a positive PSOS impact on
expected US stock returns for the period from 1983 to 2004. They interpret that high PSOS stocks
tend to be very illiquid and hence, have a positive illiquidity premium. While it is plausible that
the difference in results may be due to the different sample periods employed in both studies (our
sample period is 1996-2010 and theirs is 1983-2004), we concede that the negative PSOS coefficient
is puzzling. We, however, leave this puzzle for future research.
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One may argue that our results are likely driven by orders submitted by algorithm trading
implemented in a multiplicity of markets around the globe. The increase in high-frequency trading
accounts for the majority of trading volume in today’s markets (see Easley, Lo´pez de Prado, and
O’Hara, 2012). Such trading algorithms are designed to delay or accelerate trading in reaction to
market events within milliseconds. For example, traders may split large orders into multiple small
orders, and such orders occurring in short intervals are not truly independent observations. To rule
out this alternative interpretation, we calculate the numbers of buyer- and seller-initiated orders
by aggregating orders on the same side of the market over short intervals into a single observation
in the following ways: (i) aggregating sequential trading at the same price if there is no update
in quotes (PIN1), (ii) aggregating sequential trading within 15 seconds if there is no update in
quotes (PIN2), and (iii) aggregating sequential trading if there is no update in quotes (PIN3). We
replicate key regression models of Table 5 (i.e., M5 and M12) using these revised PIN estimates;
the results presented in Table 6 remain materially unaltered, suggesting that our main findings are
robust to high-frequency trading.
4. Additional Tests
Consistent with theoretical arguments,10 our earlier evidence of a generally insignificant PIN
effect on expected returns possibly suggests that information-risk measured by PIN is diversifiable.
Thus, it is likely that we can find similar evidence using alternative information-based trading
measures. This motivates us to exploit the richness of our database to test whether information risk
proxied by alternative trading-based information measures can explain the cross-section of expected
stock returns in international markets. If the alternative information-based trading measures, while
not PIN , have a significant positive effect on expected stock returns, then we argue that PIN may
not be a good proxy for information asymmetry. On the other hand, if the alternative trading-
based information measures also exhibit no significant impact on expected stock returns, then we
interpret that information risk related to trading-based measures, in general, is not priced.
Given that we cannot exhaust the many different measures of informed trading in the existing
10See Fama (1991), Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2007), and Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007).
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literature, we select the following four measures that we consider to be more popularly employed
in extant empirical studies. The first measure is Hasbrouck’s (1991) measure of relative trade
informativeness, R2w (equation (6), p. 577), and
R2w ≡
σ2wx
σ2w
. (6)
R2w is the coefficient of determination in a regression of price innovation w on trade innovation x.
w reflects the market’s updates to the available information set, whereas x reflects the market’s
signal of private information through trading. The second measure is Huang and Stoll’s (1996)
percentage price impact measure, %PImpact,
%PImpact =
2×Qit × (Mi,t+30 −Mit)
Mit
, (7)
where Qit is a binary variable that equals +1 for buyer-initiated orders and −1 for seller-initiated
orders; Mi,t+30 is the mid-point of the first quote reported at least 30 minutes after the transaction.
%PImpact incorporates liquidity providers’ quote revisions following a series of buyer- or seller-
initiated orders. We employ Huang and Stoll’s (1997) adverse selection component as the third
measure (equation (23), p. 1014).
∆Mt = (α+ β)
S
2
Qt−1 − αS
2
(1− 2pi)Qt−2 + t, (8)
where Mt is the quote midpoint calculated from bid-ask quotes that occur just before a transaction,
S is a constant spread, pi is the probability of trade reversals, and Qt is a buy-sell trade indicator
that equals +1 for a buyer-initiated trade and −1 for a seller-initiated. α is the adverse selection
component of the half-spread, and β is the inventory holding component. The conditional expec-
tation of the trade indicator at time t − 1, given Qt−2, is shown in equation (21) of Huang and
Stoll,
E(Qt−1|Qt−2) = (1− 2pi)Qt−2. (9)
Esimating the preceding two equations simultaneously, we obtain an estimate of the adverse selec-
tion component, α, and label it αHS . The last measure is the asymmetric information parameter
derived from Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans’s (1997) model for transaction price changes
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(equation (4), p. 1042),11
pt − pt−1 = (φ+ θ)xt − (φ+ ρθ)xt−1 + t + ξt − ξt−1, (10)
where pt − pt−1 is the change in transaction prices, φ is the cost of supplying liquidity, θ is the
asymmetric information parameter, ρ is the autocorrelation of the order flow, and xt is the trade
initiation variable. To distinguish the different notations used in this study, we use θMRR to denote
the asymmetric information parameter θ.
We proceed to replicate Fama-MacBeth regressions of M2 and M5 from Table 5 using the
above four different information-based trading measures, as well as three different first principal
components denoted by PComp1, PComp2, and PComp3. PComp1 (PComp2) is the first principal
component extracted from performing a principal component analysis on PINEHO (PINDY ), αHS ,
θMRR, %PImpact, and R
2
W , while PComp
3 is extracted using all six measures altogether. Results
are shown in Table 7.
Consistent with those of Table 5, information-based trading measures, in general, exhibit no
strongly significant effect on expected stock returns; only Huang and Stoll’s (1996, 1997) private-
information measures, %PImpact and αHS , have a marginally significant effect. The coefficient
estimates of %PImpact and αHS are 18.738 (t = 1.76) in M3 and 10.641 (t = 1.88) in M5,
respectively. But when jointly estimated with Illiquidity, they become statistically insignificant.
Illiquidity, however, continues to have a consistently, positive effect on expected stock returns.
Overall, these results suggest that information risk proxied not only by PIN , but also by four
alternative trading-based measures, in general, is not robustly priced.
5. Summary
The pricing of information asymmetry has become a recent subject of debate in both theoretical
and empirical asset pricing and microstructure literatures. On the one hand, Easley et al. (1996),
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), and Easley and O’Hara (2004) provide theoretical arguments,
with supporting empirical evidence, that information risk associated with PIN is priced. On the
11See Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) for the assumptions underlying this model specification.
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other hand, theoretical models of Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2007) and Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia
(2007) yield empirical implications that are at variance with those in Easley and O’Hara (2004).
Specifically, their models imply that information risk is potentially idiosyncratic in nature and
hence, fully diversifiable. Empirically, Duarte and Young (2009) also find no evidence that PIN
is a priced information risk. Our study contributes to this controversy over the pricing effect of
PIN by subjecting PIN to more rigorous tests but in an international setting. To the best of our
knowledge, our investigation represents the first to examine the asset pricing implications of PIN
for a large cross-section of international firms from a wide spectrum of countries around the world.
We estimate both Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara’s (2002) and Duarte and Young’s (2009)
PINs (PINEHO and PINDY ) for a sample of 30,095 firms from 47 countries worldwide for which
we have intradaily transactions data to estimate their stock-level PINs over a 15-year period from
1996 to 2010. Our international sample expands the US samples employed by Easley, Hvidkjaer,
and O’Hara and Duarte and Young, whose sample periods span from 1983 to 1998 and from
1983 to 2004, respectively. During our sample period, all stock exchanges, including those of the
United States, have moved to adopt an automated electronic limit order book system. Such a
system, however, differs from the market structure with specialists that the PIN model assumes.
Therefore, we perform two tests to ensure that PIN indeed captures the probability of informed
trading for our sample of stocks as we have expected. Results validate the reasonableness of PIN
quality by showing that both PINEHO and PINDY predict spreads in accordance with theoretical
arguments, and that they are strongly correlated with other measures of firm- and country-level
private information widely employed in existing studies.
Our analysis shows robust evidence that PIN exhibits no positive relationship with expected
stock returns. This finding not only reinforces Duarte and Young’s (2009) result that the infor-
mation asymmetry associated with PIN is not priced, but also suggests that the pricing of PIN
is not robust across international markets. We further explore whether other proxies for infor-
mation asymmetry, specifically alternative information-based trading measures, have any effect on
expected stock returns. Drawn from the existing literature, we employ four widely adopted trading-
based measures of asymmetric information and find evidence consistent with our main findings that
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information risk related to trading-based measures is not systematically priced by investors in in-
ternational markets. This finding suggests that one needs to be cautious when interpreting results
of earlier studies that rely on PIN as a priced information risk.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics of PINEHO and PINDY by Country
This table reports the mean, median, standard deviation (Std), and quartiles 1 and 3 (Q1 and Q3) of the probability of informed
trading (PIN) constructed using the Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) approach (PINEHO) and of the adjusted PIN suggested
by Duarte and Young (2009) (PINDY ). It also presents the type of market (emerging, EMG; or developed, DEV ) and the number
of firms in our sample (NFirms). See Appendix A for the starting year of availability for intraday data used to compute PIN for
firms in each country. The sample period is from 1996 to 2010.
Type of Distribution of PINEHO Distribution of PINDY
Country Market NFirms Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 Mean Std Q1 Median Q3
Argentina EMG 81 0.354 0.120 0.266 0.338 0.427 0.277 0.129 0.183 0.251 0.335
Australia DEV 1,946 0.284 0.091 0.228 0.278 0.333 0.184 0.089 0.122 0.168 0.223
Austria DEV 81 0.276 0.119 0.199 0.263 0.325 0.226 0.101 0.157 0.206 0.266
Belgium DEV 148 0.265 0.110 0.196 0.249 0.308 0.199 0.095 0.129 0.180 0.244
Brazil EMG 152 0.288 0.100 0.217 0.270 0.352 0.240 0.096 0.180 0.217 0.275
Canada DEV 1,210 0.272 0.095 0.208 0.260 0.323 0.239 0.098 0.173 0.221 0.286
Chile EMG 113 0.318 0.101 0.244 0.316 0.378 0.291 0.114 0.208 0.275 0.366
China EMG 1,791 0.175 0.072 0.131 0.163 0.201 0.146 0.069 0.100 0.125 0.183
Denmark DEV 217 0.268 0.097 0.206 0.258 0.310 0.175 0.086 0.115 0.159 0.205
Egypt EMG 200 0.339 0.120 0.245 0.328 0.423 0.283 0.119 0.194 0.262 0.351
Finland DEV 148 0.236 0.077 0.189 0.236 0.278 0.204 0.093 0.142 0.186 0.243
France DEV 829 0.241 0.093 0.183 0.234 0.284 0.206 0.084 0.149 0.193 0.250
Germany DEV 936 0.206 0.088 0.155 0.191 0.234 0.195 0.091 0.136 0.178 0.229
Greece EMG 337 0.250 0.091 0.186 0.228 0.291 0.221 0.099 0.152 0.197 0.260
Hong Kong DEV 1,086 0.278 0.080 0.228 0.273 0.320 0.186 0.079 0.134 0.174 0.219
India EMG 2,739 0.263 0.088 0.200 0.254 0.316 0.195 0.088 0.138 0.178 0.224
Indonesia EMG 399 0.385 0.112 0.309 0.375 0.448 0.275 0.096 0.210 0.259 0.320
Ireland DEV 59 0.262 0.084 0.207 0.252 0.316 0.234 0.103 0.158 0.213 0.288
Israel EMG 644 0.268 0.093 0.208 0.257 0.309 0.238 0.101 0.169 0.220 0.281
Italy DEV 344 0.220 0.078 0.168 0.211 0.263 0.173 0.081 0.121 0.154 0.199
Japan DEV 2,902 0.233 0.087 0.168 0.221 0.285 0.207 0.100 0.134 0.187 0.251
Jordan EMG 226 0.349 0.101 0.279 0.341 0.411 0.286 0.113 0.202 0.262 0.359
Luxembourg DEV 10 0.379 0.130 0.287 0.346 0.460 0.222 0.116 0.128 0.207 0.276
Malaysia EMG 1,145 0.315 0.079 0.260 0.309 0.361 0.234 0.084 0.183 0.220 0.266
Mexico EMG 115 0.317 0.115 0.226 0.303 0.399 0.269 0.114 0.188 0.251 0.331
Netherlands DEV 158 0.214 0.083 0.156 0.204 0.258 0.210 0.100 0.140 0.187 0.248
New Zealand DEV 129 0.364 0.179 0.238 0.312 0.461 0.336 0.160 0.215 0.309 0.442
Norway DEV 278 0.276 0.092 0.215 0.272 0.326 0.237 0.102 0.164 0.217 0.282
Pakistan EMG 418 0.314 0.094 0.247 0.305 0.368 0.238 0.098 0.171 0.217 0.290
Peru EMG 63 0.391 0.099 0.327 0.381 0.436 0.327 0.121 0.240 0.310 0.402
Philippines EMG 223 0.330 0.090 0.265 0.321 0.388 0.251 0.090 0.196 0.237 0.292
Poland EMG 392 0.296 0.090 0.241 0.284 0.339 0.241 0.095 0.179 0.224 0.275
Portugal EMG 57 0.294 0.126 0.200 0.285 0.356 0.251 0.112 0.166 0.231 0.307
Russia EMG 264 0.288 0.106 0.210 0.279 0.347 0.221 0.090 0.157 0.201 0.266
Saudi Arabia EMG 137 0.257 0.116 0.183 0.240 0.303 0.200 0.081 0.149 0.181 0.228
Singapore DEV 801 0.297 0.080 0.245 0.290 0.341 0.180 0.083 0.123 0.165 0.217
South Africa EMG 449 0.305 0.105 0.231 0.297 0.371 0.260 0.113 0.180 0.241 0.322
South Korea EMG 802 0.237 0.075 0.185 0.225 0.275 0.202 0.076 0.155 0.185 0.225
Spain DEV 153 0.208 0.071 0.159 0.199 0.245 0.175 0.088 0.115 0.151 0.201
Sri Lanka EMG 194 0.320 0.110 0.248 0.306 0.376 0.207 0.095 0.140 0.193 0.255
Sweden DEV 504 0.241 0.080 0.190 0.230 0.278 0.219 0.096 0.155 0.196 0.255
Switzerland DEV 275 0.282 0.098 0.216 0.269 0.328 0.246 0.101 0.177 0.225 0.297
Taiwan EMG 1,413 0.219 0.083 0.161 0.201 0.256 0.178 0.094 0.118 0.147 0.202
Thailand EMG 572 0.306 0.105 0.237 0.281 0.346 0.217 0.075 0.174 0.205 0.245
Turkey EMG 329 0.220 0.062 0.181 0.207 0.244 0.180 0.073 0.140 0.162 0.195
United Kingdom DEV 2,269 0.247 0.098 0.180 0.238 0.297 0.221 0.107 0.148 0.199 0.261
United States DEV 2,357 0.190 0.098 0.121 0.161 0.235 0.170 0.082 0.112 0.151 0.201
DEV 16,840 0.261 0.096 0.197 0.248 0.309 0.211 0.097 0.143 0.192 0.254
EMG 13,255 0.296 0.098 0.228 0.284 0.349 0.237 0.098 0.171 0.218 0.282
ALL 30,095 0.279 0.097 0.213 0.267 0.330 0.225 0.097 0.158 0.206 0.269
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Table 6
Robustness Tests Using PIN Estimates Based on Different Order-Aggregation Methods
This table repeats Fama-MacBeth regressions of M5 and M12 of Table 5 using PIN esti-
mated from the number of buy or sell orders by (i) aggregating sequential trading at the
same price if there is no update in quotes (PIN1), (ii) aggregating sequential trading within
15 seconds if there is no update in quotes (PIN2), and (iii) aggregating sequential trading if
there is no update in quotes (PIN3). It shows time-series averages of the slope coefficients
from the following cross-sectional regression.
rit+1 = γ0+γ1PIN
#
it +γ2Illiquidityit+γ3βi,Gt+γ4βi,Ct+γ5BMit+γ6Sizeit+it+1. (13)
rit+1 is the monthly stock return of firm i in excess of a 30-day US Treasury bill rate at
time t + 1; PIN is the probability of information-based trading estimated using the EHO
framework (PINEHO) or Duarte and Young’s (2009) approach (PINDY ); Illiquidity is the
Amihud illiquidity measure; βG (βC) is the covariance of the stock return with the global
(country) market returns over the past five years divided by the global market (country)
return variance, where country index return is orthogonalized to the global market return;
BM is the log book-to-market ratio of the firm; Size is the log firm market capitalization;
 is a forecast error. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Monthly excess returns are
from January 1997 to December 2011 and firm-specific variables are from 1996 to 2010. All
t−statistics reported in parentheses are based on Newey-West standard errors.
PIN1EHO PIN
2
EHO PIN
3
EHO PIN
1
DY PIN
2
DY PIN
3
DY
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
PIN# -0.638 -1.062 -0.818 -0.265 -0.146 -0.493
(-3.20) (-3.90) (-3.32) (-1.58) (-0.65) (-2.81)
Illiquidity 0.090 0.093 0.090 0.081 0.088 0.090
(2.79) (2.84) (2.74) (2.53) (2.68) (2.82)
βG 0.036 0.039 0.031 0.027 0.027 0.038
(0.22) (0.23) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22)
βC 0.012 0.006 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.042
(0.17) (0.08) (0.39) (0.40) (0.38) (0.52)
BM 0.438 0.443 0.443 0.435 0.452 0.440
(5.79) (5.87) (5.90) (5.63) (5.91) (5.69)
Size 0.130 0.129 0.132 0.109 0.132 0.139
(2.02) (1.98) (2.05) (1.69) (2.04) (2.16)
Intercept -0.137 -0.040 -0.160 0.004 -0.292 -0.360
(-0.15) (-0.04) (-0.18) (0.00) (-0.33) (-0.40)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
32
T
a
b
le
7
E
ff
e
c
ts
o
f
P
I
N
a
n
d
O
th
e
r
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
-B
a
se
d
T
ra
d
in
g
M
e
a
su
re
s
o
n
C
ro
ss
-S
e
c
ti
o
n
a
l
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
S
to
ck
R
e
tu
rn
s
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
ea
ts
F
a
m
a
-M
a
cB
et
h
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
o
f
M
2
a
n
d
M
5
o
f
T
a
b
le
5
u
si
n
g
d
iff
er
en
t
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
-b
a
se
d
tr
a
d
in
g
m
ea
su
re
s,
I
n
f
A
sy
tr
a
d
e
,
a
s
fo
ll
o
w
s.
r i
t+
1
=
γ
0
+
γ
1
I
n
f
A
sy
tr
a
d
e
,i
t
+
γ
2
I
ll
iq
u
id
it
y
it
+
γ
3
β
i,
W
t
+
γ
4
β
i,
C
t
+
γ
5
B
M
it
+
γ
6
S
iz
e i
t
+
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
+
 i
t+
1
.
(1
4
)
r i
t+
1
is
th
e
m
o
n
th
ly
st
o
ck
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
o
f
fi
rm
i
in
ex
ce
ss
o
f
a
3
0
-d
a
y
U
S
T
re
a
su
ry
b
il
l
ra
te
a
t
ti
m
e
t
+
1
.
I
n
f
A
sy
tr
a
d
e
in
cl
u
d
es
a
li
st
o
f
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
-b
a
se
d
tr
a
d
in
g
m
ea
su
re
s
su
ch
a
s
th
e
E
H
O
P
I
N
E
H
O
,
D
u
a
rt
e
a
n
d
Y
o
u
n
g
’s
(2
0
0
9
)
P
I
N
D
Y
,
H
a
sb
ro
u
ck
’s
(1
9
9
1
)
re
la
ti
v
e
tr
a
d
e
in
fo
rm
a
ti
v
en
es
s
m
ea
su
re
R
2 W
,
H
u
a
n
g
a
n
d
S
to
ll
’s
(1
9
9
6
)
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
ri
ce
im
p
a
ct
m
ea
su
re
,
%
P
I
m
p
a
ct
,
H
u
a
n
g
a
n
d
S
to
ll
’s
(1
9
9
7
)
a
d
v
er
se
se
le
ct
io
n
co
m
p
o
n
en
t
α
H
S
,
a
n
d
M
a
d
h
a
v
a
n
,
R
ic
h
a
rd
so
n
,
a
n
d
R
o
o
m
a
n
s’
s
(1
9
9
7
)
a
d
v
er
se
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
p
a
ra
m
et
er
θ M
R
R
,
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
th
re
e
d
iff
er
en
t
fi
rs
t
p
ri
n
ci
p
a
l
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
d
en
o
te
d
b
y
P
C
o
m
p
1
,
P
C
o
m
p
2
,
a
n
d
P
C
o
m
p
3
.
P
C
o
m
p
1
(P
C
o
m
p
2
)
is
th
e
fi
rs
t
p
ri
n
ci
p
a
l
co
m
p
o
n
en
t
ex
tr
a
ct
ed
fr
o
m
p
er
fo
rm
in
g
a
p
ri
n
ci
p
a
l
co
m
p
o
n
en
t
a
n
a
ly
si
s
o
n
P
I
N
E
H
O
(P
I
N
D
Y
)
a
n
d
th
e
o
th
er
fo
u
r
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
-b
a
se
d
tr
a
d
in
g
m
ea
su
re
s,
n
a
m
el
y
R
2 W
,
%
P
I
m
p
a
ct
,
α
H
S
,
a
n
d
θ M
R
R
,
a
n
d
P
C
o
m
p
3
is
ex
tr
a
ct
ed
u
si
n
g
a
ll
si
x
m
ea
su
re
s
a
lt
o
g
et
h
er
.
I
ll
iq
u
id
it
y
is
th
e
A
m
ih
u
d
il
li
q
u
id
it
y
m
ea
su
re
;
β
G
(β
C
)
is
th
e
co
v
a
ri
a
n
ce
o
f
th
e
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
w
it
h
th
e
g
lo
b
a
l
(c
o
u
n
tr
y
)
m
a
rk
et
in
d
ex
re
tu
rn
o
v
er
th
e
p
a
st
fi
v
e
y
ea
rs
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
th
e
g
lo
b
a
l
(c
o
u
n
tr
y
)
m
a
rk
et
in
d
ex
re
tu
rn
v
a
ri
a
n
ce
;
B
M
is
th
e
lo
g
b
o
o
k
-t
o
-m
a
rk
et
ra
ti
o
o
f
th
e
fi
rm
;
S
iz
e
is
th
e
lo
g
fi
rm
m
a
rk
et
ca
p
it
a
li
za
ti
o
n
;

is
a
fo
re
ca
st
er
ro
r.
A
ll
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
d
efi
n
ed
in
A
p
p
en
d
ix
B
.
A
ll
t−
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
a
re
b
a
se
d
o
n
N
ew
ey
-W
es
t
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
.
M
o
n
th
ly
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
s
a
re
fr
o
m
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
9
7
to
D
ec
em
b
er
2
0
1
1
. D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
o
f
In
fo
r
m
a
ti
o
n
-B
a
se
d
T
r
a
d
in
g
M
e
a
su
r
e
s,
I
n
f
A
sy
tr
a
d
e
R
2 W
%
P
I
m
p
a
ct
α
H
S
θ M
R
R
P
C
o
m
p
1
P
C
o
m
p
2
P
C
o
m
p
3
V
a
ri
a
b
le
M
1
M
2
M
3
M
4
M
5
M
6
M
7
M
8
M
9
M
1
0
M
1
1
M
1
2
M
1
3
M
1
4
I
n
f
A
sy
T
r
a
d
e
0
.1
8
9
0
.4
9
2
1
8
.7
3
8
1
1
.2
4
5
1
0
.6
4
1
4
.6
3
3
1
3
.2
2
0
-2
.1
0
2
0
.0
4
3
-0
.0
8
1
0
.0
6
9
-0
.0
2
7
0
.0
3
7
-0
.0
9
5
(0
.4
5
)
(1
.2
2
)
(1
.7
6
)
(0
.9
4
)
(1
.8
8
)
(0
.8
5
)
(1
.1
7
)
(-
0
.2
0
)
(0
.6
4
)
(-
1
.1
5
)
(1
.0
2
)
(-
0
.3
8
)
(0
.5
9
)
(-
1
.5
0
)
I
ll
iq
u
id
it
y
0
.0
9
1
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
9
0
0
.0
9
2
0
.1
1
0
0
.0
9
9
0
.1
1
3
(3
.0
2
)
(2
.2
3
)
(2
.9
6
)
(2
.9
5
)
(3
.1
9
)
(2
.9
0
)
(3
.3
5
)
β
G
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
3
5
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
2
5
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
3
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
3
3
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
4
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
4
0
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.2
1
)
(-
0
.0
1
)
(0
.1
5
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.1
7
)
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.1
9
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.2
2
)
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.2
0
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.2
2
)
β
C
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
1
1
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
1
3
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.2
2
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.1
9
)
(-
0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.2
1
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.1
8
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.1
5
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.1
8
)
B
M
0
.4
2
9
0
.4
3
6
0
.4
3
4
0
.4
3
8
0
.4
3
6
0
.4
4
4
0
.4
3
3
0
.4
3
7
0
.4
3
1
0
.4
3
1
0
.4
3
2
0
.4
3
4
0
.4
3
1
0
.4
3
1
(5
.5
8
)
(5
.7
5
)
(5
.6
8
)
(5
.8
1
)
(5
.1
8
)
(5
.3
3
)
(5
.3
2
)
(5
.4
3
)
(5
.2
0
)
(5
.2
7
)
(5
.1
9
)
(5
.2
7
)
(5
.2
1
)
(5
.2
8
)
S
iz
e
0
.0
1
3
0
.1
2
6
0
.0
3
5
0
.1
2
2
0
.0
5
3
0
.1
5
7
0
.0
6
1
0
.1
5
2
0
.0
5
7
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
6
4
0
.1
5
8
0
.0
5
6
0
.1
5
7
(0
.3
0
)
(2
.1
1
)
(0
.9
2
)
(1
.9
5
)
(1
.1
9
)
(2
.5
3
)
(1
.3
7
)
(2
.4
4
)
(1
.3
4
)
(2
.5
1
)
(1
.5
4
)
(2
.5
5
)
(1
.3
0
)
(2
.5
2
)
In
te
rc
ep
t
0
.8
4
6
-0
.3
8
6
0
.5
8
8
-0
.2
6
0
0
.3
8
3
-0
.6
4
0
0
.2
4
0
-0
.5
6
1
0
.3
4
3
-0
.5
8
5
0
.2
5
6
-0
.6
3
0
0
.3
5
9
-0
.5
8
3
(1
.3
4
)
(-
0
.4
9
)
(0
.9
3
)
(-
0
.3
0
)
(0
.5
3
)
(-
0
.7
2
)
(0
.3
3
)
(-
0
.6
4
)
(0
.4
9
)
(-
0
.6
7
)
(0
.3
7
)
(-
0
.7
3
)
(0
.5
1
)
(-
0
.6
7
)
C
o
u
n
tr
y
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
33
Appendix A
Stock Exchange and Starting Years of Automated Trading and Transactions Data by Country
This table lists the exchange(s) whose stocks are included in this study and the starting year of its (their) electronic
limit order book system, which is obtained from Jain (2005), and of its global transactions data from TRTH database
by country.
Starting Year
Country Stock Exchange(s) Automated Trading TRTH Data
Argentina Buenos Aires Stock Exchange 1995 1998
Australia Australian Stock Exchange 1987 1996
Austria Vienna Stock Exchange 1996 1996
Belgium Euronext Brussels 1996 1996
Brazil Sao Paolo Stock Exchange 1990 1998
Canada Toronto Stock Exchange 1977 1996
Chile Santiago Stock Exchange 1989 2002
China Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 1990 1996
Denmark Copenhagen Stock Exchange 1988 1996
Egypt Cairo Stock Exchange 1997 1996
Finland Helsinki Stock Exchange 1988 1996
France Euronext Paris 1986 1996
Germany Frankfurt Stock Exchange 1991 1996
Greece Athens Stock Exchange 1992 1996
Hong Kong Hong Kong Stock Exchange 1986 1996
India Mumbai Stock Exchange 1995 1996
Indonesia Jakarta Stock Exchange 1995 1996
Ireland Irish Stock Exchange 2000 2000
Israel Tel Aviv Stock Exchange 1997 1996
Italy Milan Stock Exchange 1994 1996
Japan Tokyo Stock Exchange and Osaka Securities Exchange 1982 1996
Jordan Amman Stock Exchange 2000 2000
Korea Korea Stock Exchange 1988 1997
Luxembourg Luxembourg Stock Exchange 1991 1999
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 1992 1996
Mexico Bolsa Mexicana de Volores 1996 1996
Netherlands Euronext Amsterdam 1994 1996
New Zealand New Zealand Stock Exchange 1991 1996
Norway Oslo Stock Exchange 1988 1996
Pakistan Karachi Stock Exchange 1997 2001
Peru Lima Stock Exchange 1995 1998
Philippines Philippine Stock Exchange 1993 1996
Poland Warsaw Stock Exchange 1996 2001
Portugal Euronext Lisbon 1991 1996
Russia Russian Trading System 1994 1996
Saudi Arabia Saudi Stock Exchange 1990 2002
Singapore Singapore Stock Exchange 1989 1996
South Africa Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1996 1996
Spain SIBE-Mercado Continuo Espanol 1989 1996
Sri Lanka Colombo Stock Exchange 1997 1998
Sweden Stockholm Stock Exchange 1989 1996
Switzerland Swiss Exchange 1996 1996
Taiwan Taiwan Stock Exchange 1985 1996
Thailand Thailand Stock Exchange 1991 1996
Turkey Istanbul Stock Exchange 1993 1996
U.K. London Stock Exchange 1997 1996
U.S. AMEX and NYSE 2000 (NYSE) 1996
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